





























































MORALITY: MORAL POWER AS 
CARNAL RESONANCE
ABSTRACT
This commentary focuses on the cinematic and intellectual work of Miguel 
De, expressed through The Kiss and its accompanying essay. The objective 
here is to problematize some of the historical and technocultural connections 
raised by the essay, and to frame De’s experimental essay film within a 
wider tradition of (mostly European) film-making who has as its main aim 
a troubling of the notion of “pornography”. This troubling is often done 
through a double deployment of vision: the audience is shown a named 
something, but maybe not what they were expecting to see, and it is through 
the disconnect between the naming and the showing that the connections 
between sexuality, obscenity and carnal resonance are made apparent 
and contingent. However, as these acts of troubling circulate within the 
contemporary technological capitalist mediasphere, they quickly become 
a locus for a potential site of capture, normalization and redeployment of 
power relationships.
























































173 If there is one thing that Miguel De’s work empirically and theoretically 
demonstrates to the utmost degree is that drawing lines is a fundamentally 
powerful anthropological experience. We draw lines when we write, say or 
think “we”, we draw lines when we conceptualize “there”, “wrong”, “holy”, 
“sexual” – the examples are potentially infinite, and they happen at all lev-
els – are we that separate (id est, is there a line) from non-human animals 
(Agamben, 2004), are we able to stake out a scientific and academic field 
(Pereira, 2017), can we have genders (Butler, 2017), can we even have 
ourselves (Butler, 2005)?
All in all, this is the crux of symbolic interactionism (Becker, 1997) 
– that drawing lines is a continuous process in time, and that it involves 
a series of tensions through which power is articulated. Space does not 
permit me to delve into the concept of “power” itself as so clearly (and 
lengthily) articulated by Foucault (1994) over some 5 pages, but suffice 
it to say that, in his perspective, power is not something that can be had, 
only exerted, that it only exists in relation. These relations are the drawings 
(and erasings, and modifications) of those lines themselves. It is no surprise 
that, then, Gayle Rubin’s (2007) ‘Charmed Circle’ consisted of the analysis 
of how and when and by whom were lines drawn around “good” and “bad” 
sexuality, and how those lines moved. However, it is not enough to note 
that those lines shift and are contingent, it is always important to note, with 
Derrida (1982), that the attempt at making a distinction is the marker itself of 
an indistinction, a connection where a disconnection is sought. As Attwood 
(2002) rightly argues, attempting to define pornography is what creates 
pornography, because pornography is not a characteristic of a media object 
or manifestation, but rather its framing in a certain context, by a certain 
group, through a series of moral operations – where the pornographic is 
situated as a subsection of the obscene.
Miguel De (2021) draws on Saunders to say that there is no clear 
connection between sexuality and obscenity in Ancient Greece, and 
that that connection is later established with Christianity, and with the 
reconceptualizing of divinity as “an asexual entity”, where the proximity 
with animality, corporeity and sex is what allows for the drawing of that line 
that makes sex acts and obscenity in general be mostly on the same side, 
with the spiritual or the rational being on the other side. According to De 
(2021), “there is no reason to be seen or hidden” in Greco-Roman art, and 
so the obscene as an injunction to not-see or not-made-seen, because 
sex in itself was not connotated with secrecy, with animality and carnality. 
But the Greeks themselves would make us doubt this line that Miguel 
De draws: in fact, animal behaviour – and specifically what was seen as 
the coy, prudent, modest behaviour of some animals, who supposedly 
hid away to have sex and only had sex to procreate – was exalted as 
a role-model in Ancient Greece, long before Christianity, showing how 
much obscenity (as an order of that which should not be seen or exalted) 
was already very much a thing back then (Foucault, 2017). We must 

























































174 We must also go back a ways more than 1957 to find the Law’s 
concern with the obscene, even if we must do so indirectly by going 
back to pornography: “pornography” came about as a word, in France, 
as a treatise on prostitution in the 18th century, by Restif de la Bretonne 
(pornography being porne [prostitute] + graphein [writing]) and quickly 
became deployed for the purpose of censorship in the 19th century by 
French authorities (Hunt, 1993), alongside other terms like sedition or 
heresy (Aberdein, 2010). This, of course, puts us back where we started 
– the différance of Derrida (1982), the chasing of the potential ‘true’ 
meaning of this term by marking its uniqueness, which continuously defers 
the difference, while still seemingly producing it. That pornography and 
obscenity are not the same but are also always connected is clear in 
Matthew Kieran’s (2002, p. 54) exhaustive definition of “obscene”:
x is appropriately judged obscene if and only if either (A) x is 
appropriately classified as a member of a form or class of objects 
whose authorized purpose is to solicit and commend to us cognitive-
affective responses which are (1) internalized as morally prohibited 
and (2) does so in ways found to be or which are held to warrant 
repulsion and (3) does so in order to (a) indulge first-order desires 
held to be morally prohibited or (b) indulge the desire to be morally 
transgressive or the desire to feel repulsed or (c) afford cognitive 
rewards or (d) any combination thereof or (B) x successfully elicits 
cognitive-affective responses which conform to conditions (1)-(3).
Prohibition, morality and the responses – the carnal resonances (Paas-
onen, 2011) – that things might produce make them potentially obscene; 
and a subset of those is connected (in whatever which way) to sex, which 
then makes the obscene pornographic. Miguel De’s The Kiss seeks to 
trouble these connections by precisely provoking different carnal res-
onances than the ones associated with porn, while using footage and 
sounds from porn – the resulting experience can vary, I imagine, between 
a certain aesthetic boredom, an overload of the way the sound is mashed 
together, halted, dragged along or made non-diegetic, and maybe even 
a touch of abjection (Kristeva, 1984) by how the time-stretching of the 
images becomes a time-stretching of body parts into unfamiliar (maybe 
unheimlich? (Freud, 2003)) configurations. 
In this, The Kiss plays with visibility and invisibility, with showing 
some things to let the viewers assume others, in the exact same way that 
the My Beautiful Agony series does – it denies the hyper-visible regime of 
cinema while not denying the titillation (the carnal resonances) that attach 
to moral prohibition. Prozorov’s (2011) analysis of that shorts’ series through 
the framework of Agamben’s work is relevant here: pornography tries to 
show the “real” in all its potential, and by trying to do so, fails (namely the 
pornographic “money shot” shows almost nothing in its attempt to show 
everything). So, resisting normative trappings of pornography and sexuality 
involves doing just what The Kiss does, since it is a “practice that indicates, 
























































175 excessive visibility and of reality], demonstrating the impossibility of their 
coincidence” (Prozorov, 2011, p. 83).
A whole series of media products, commonly referred to as “post-
porn” (Borghi, 2013; Bourcier, 2014; Rojas, 2014), dedicate themselves to 
various strategies of subverting expectations around what can or cannot 
be considered pornography, about what is the relationship between the 
pornographic and the artistic, and how both the denying of visibility and 
the reshaping of visibility into a fourth-wall-breaking mechanism disrupt 
the apparent contradiction – rightly noted by Miguel De (2021) and posited 
by Foucault – between having access to full, on-demand, visibility and 
drawing power from keeping some things hidden from some people in 
some contexts. It is crucial to note that, often, wanting to not be seen is 
nothing more than an exercise in privilege, since for others, invisibility 
is forced upon them, and at times deadly – for those, being seen and 
reinventing ways of showing oneself outside of the constraints of big 
media companies or multinational streaming platforms is a prime political, 
carnal, and ethical project (Cardoso & Paasonen, 2021).
A final note, though, needs to be made. Miguel De’s montage of 
pornographic films takes as self-evident an “act […] [that] is not simulated” 
(De, 2021). This runs the risk of leaving some lines drawn in the sand, 
forgotten and unseen but not ineffective – the line between sex and not-
sex, the line between bodies and not-bodies. These lines, as all others, 
are contingent, contextual. Therefore, it is fundamental to consider how 
technical representations of certain acts constitute, in themselves, a 
set of gears in the wider dispositif (Agamben, 2005; Cascais, 2009), or 
technology, of (doing) sex (P. B. Preciado, 2011, 2017) and (being) bodies 
(Cardoso, 2018).
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